Virginia Commonwealth University

VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2017

Synchrony and concordance: A multilevel analysis of the effects
of individual differences during a CO2 challenge
Rachel E. Wallace
Virginia Commonwealth University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons
© The Author

Downloaded from
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/4873

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass.
For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.

Synchrony and concordance: A multilevel analysis of the effects of individual
differences during a CO2 challenge

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
at Virginia Commonwealth University
By: Rachel E. Wallace
B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2014
Director: Scott Vrana, Ph.D.
Professor
Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, VA
May 9th, 2017

Acknowledgements
With the completion of this thesis, I would like to thank several people. First, Dr. Scott Vrana
has been a patient, supportive mentor throughout this project, and this process has helped me
grow as a professional and researcher. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr.
Roxann Roberson-Nay and Dr. Charles Calderwood for their time and commitment to this
project. I thoroughly enjoyed hearing their ideas and look forward to future research. Finally, I
would like to thank my family and friends for their continued support and encouragement.

This study was funded by a National Institute of Mental Health grant to Dr. Roxann RobersonNay (K01MH080953) and a National Institute on Aging grant to Dr. Bethany Teachman
(R01AG033033). Preliminary

ii

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ ii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ iv
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................v
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vi
Introduction .....................................................................................................................................1
Literature Review ............................................................................................................................5
Synchrony/Desynchrony and Concordance/Discordance Literature ....................................6
Factors that Affect Concordance and Synchrony .................................................................9
Individual Differences ..........................................................................................................9
Methodological Concerns ...................................................................................................12
Theoretical Considerations .................................................................................................14
Anxiety Sensitivity ..............................................................................................................16
Heart Rate Variability ..........................................................................................................18
Carbon Dioxide Challenge ..................................................................................................20
Statement of Problem ....................................................................................................................20
Present Study .......................................................................................................................21
Research Hypotheses ..........................................................................................................21
Method ...........................................................................................................................................22
Participants ...........................................................................................................................22
Procedure .............................................................................................................................22
Measures ..............................................................................................................................25
Analytic Strategies ...............................................................................................................25
Results ............................................................................................................................................27
Discussion ......................................................................................................................................30
Concordance (Hypothesis 1) ................................................................................................31
Synchrony (Hypothesis 2)....................................................................................................34
Individual Differences Affecting Synchrony (Hypotheses 3 and 4) ....................................35
Anxiety Sensitivity...............................................................................................................37
Heart Rate Variability ..........................................................................................................39
Limitations and Future Directions .................................................................................................40
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................42
Appendix ........................................................................................................................................44
References ......................................................................................................................................46

iii

List of Tables
Table 1. Models predicting HR from Level-1 predictor
SUDS and Level-2 predictors HRV and AS .................................................................44
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for our Level 1 and Level 2 variables ...........................................45

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1. Participants’ highest SUDS rating and its associated HR ........................................45

v

Abstract
SYNCHRONY AND CONCORDANCE: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS
OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES DURING A CO2 CHALLENGE
By Rachel E. Wallace, B.S.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017
Major Director: Scott R. Vrana, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Psychology
Keywords: emotion, synchrony, concordance, individual differences, anxiety
Emotion theories posit that emotion systems (e.g., behavior, self-report, physiology) should be
related when an emotion is being elicited because this serves an adaptive purpose and allows the
individual to respond appropriately to the present situation. Oftentimes, this coherent relationship
is not found, and research has hypothesized that the type of analyses used and lack of
examination of individual differences could be affecting this relationship. Most studies examine
the relationship between emotion systems between-subjects when within-subjects analyses may
be more appropriate. The present study examined the relationship between self-reported distress
(SUDS) and heart rate, and whether trait differences of anxiety sensitivity and heart rate
variability affect that relationship. Undergraduate students (N = 294) completed an anxiety
sensitivity measure and their heart rate variability was calculated prior to undergoing a 7.5%
CO2 challenge. SUDS was collected 11 times throughout the challenge and heart rate was
collected continuously. Consistent with studies examining both concordance (between-subjects
correlation between systems) and synchrony (within-subjects correlation between systems),
synchrony was found between heart rate and SUDS, but concordance was not found between the
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two variables. Contrary to our hypotheses, neither anxiety sensitivity nor heart rate variability
predicted synchrony between heart rate and SUDS. Our results suggest that synchrony is a more
appropriate measure of adaptive emotional response than concordance because synchrony allows
for examination of coordination of emotion systems over time.
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Introduction
Hodges (1968) stated that one of the most interesting phenomena in psychological
research is the discordance between a person’s physiology and their self-report during a stressor.
Though there is a widely-held belief that when a specific emotion is being elicited an
individuals’ self-report and physiology should be synced together, studies generally show that
there is not a concordant relationship between the two. Hodges cites Schachter’s (1962) theory in
which he proposes that “the identification of a specific emotion is the result of a reaction to a
particular situation that leads one to label physiological arousal as having meanings of a
particular emotional state”. Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) cite the canonical fear response,
which presumably involves a concordant combination of a threat appraisal, a fearful outward
appearance, increased sympathetic arousal, and a desire to escape the situation. These
conceptualizations assume that when one experiences an emotion, one also experiences a change
in both behavior and physiology. However, research generally does not support this assumption.
Numerous terms have been used to describe the relationship between physiology and
self-report. Rachman and Hodgson (1974) describe synchrony and desynchrony and
concordance and discordance in the context of fear and avoidance. They state that
...when fear and avoidance are not co-varying, one can speak of a discordance between
the two at any particular point: when there is a high correlation between the two then one
has concordance. The terms synchrony and desynchrony have a similar but not identical
meaning to that of concordance and discordance. It is suggested that synchrony and
desynchrony should be restricted to changes in fear and avoidance which either vary
together (synchrony) or vary independently or inversely (in both of these cases, one has
desynchrony).
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Discordance occurs when correlations between measures at a specific time are low, and
desynchrony describes the occurrence of low or no correlations between change scores from
different timepoints (Hodgson & Rachman, 1974). Although both concordance/discordance and
synchrony/desynchrony have been used in the literature to describe the relationship of measures
between-subjects, only synchrony/desynchrony has the ability to accurately capture the
relationship between changes within-subjects over time. Based on the definitions proposed by
Rachman and Hodgson (1974) and the analyses that will be used in this paper, the terms
synchrony and desynchrony will be used to describe within-subjects changes over time, and
concordance and discordance will be used to describe the between-subjects relationship between
measures. Although many studies have used a number of terms (e.g., response coherence,
response components, synchronization; see Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014) to describe the
relationship between emotion systems, we used synchrony/desynchrony when these studies
examined within-subjects and concordance/discordance for between-subjects in order to
facilitate comprehension.
Many approaches have been taken to examine synchrony and concordance. Studies of the
relationship between psychophysiological and self-report measures have been conducted in
clinical and non-clinical samples (Eifert, Zvolensky, Sorrell, Hopko, and Lejuez, 1999;
McTeague and Lang, 2012), have used paradigms to elicit different emotions (Campbell and
Ehlert, 2011; Grossberg and Wilson, 1968; Mauss, et al., 2011), have examined individual
differences (Dan-Glauser and Gross, 2013; Ruggiero, Black, Larkin, and Taylor, 2002; Salmon,
2001), have used different physiological and behavioral measures (Lang, Melamed, and Hart,
1970), and have induced different levels of arousal and demand (Watson, Gaind, and Marks,
1972). Results have been mixed regardless of these factors (Alpers & Sell, 2008), with results
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showing that there is concordance and discordance between variables measuring physiological
output, self-report, and/or behavior.
Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) propose three explanations for the mixed findings of
concordance between individuals’ self-report, psychophysiological output, and behavior. The
first explanation is that the theories used to explain the relationship between these variables are
“wrong”. These authors state that instead of analyzing emotion as “an abstract, theoretical
construct”, it should be defined by more objective, observable definitions. The lack of
moderators and individual differences included in this research is the second explanation
proposed by Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014). Third, these authors explain that the
methodology commonly used is poor and does not accurately account for the phenomena
occurring. These concerns will be addressed in the literature review.
The primary goal of this project is to examine heart rate variability (HRV) and anxiety
sensitivity (AS) as individual difference variables affecting the relationship between
physiological and self-report measures. HRV is a measure of self-regulation and can be used to
determine how an individual will respond to a stress-inducing situation (Miu, Heilman, &
Miclea, 2008). The neurovisceral integration model is a framework which integrates affective
regulation, attentional regulation, and heart rate variability, and describes how adaptively an
individual will respond to one’s environment (Thayer & Lane, 2000). Because people with
greater baseline HRV exhibit greater emotion regulation (Porges, 1991) and respond more
adaptively to their environment, it is hypothesized that individuals with greater HRV will show a
more adaptive and integrated response to the CO2 challenge and therefore exhibit a more
synchronous relationship between HR and SUDS during the challenge.
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Another individual difference that may influence the relationship between physiology and
self-report is one’s level of anxiety sensitivity, which is one’s fear of anxiety-related symptoms
(Reiss and McNally, 1985). Increased anxiety sensitivity levels predict anxious responding in
the laboratory (McNally & Eke, 1996; Zvolensky, et al., 2002). The interoceptive sensitivity
hypothesis states that individuals with high AS are “…characterized by an enhanced ability to
accurately detect arousal-related bodily sensations” (Stewart, Buffett-Jerrott, & Kokaram, 2001).
Based on this hypothesis, we propose that individuals with higher AS will exhibit a more
synchronous relationship between HR and self-reported distress because these individuals will be
more aware of their physiological symptoms and will respond synchronously with their selfreport.
An additional goal of this project is to use a within-subjects approach in order to examine
synchrony. Reisenzein (2000) states that using a between-subjects data analysis method to study
the relationship between physiological and self-report measures of emotion is “suboptimal”
compared to using a within-subjects approach, because there are a number of inter-individual
differences that exist between-subjects, and using a between-subjects analysis does not account
for those differences. The Reisenzein (2000) study, which will be elaborated on further, supports
the notion that methodology can affect the degree of synchrony found between measures.
Further, Sze, Gyurak, Yuan, and Levenson (2010) posit that within-subjects analyses may
represent the construct of emotion better than between-subjects analyses because within-subjects
analyses account for the relationship between emotion systems over time.
In the present study, we used the carbon dioxide (CO2) challenge in order to induce panic
and anxiety symptoms in participants. This study involves participants breathing in 7.5% CO2
air for eight minutes, introduced without the participants’ awareness after five minutes of
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breathing room air. This method has proven to reliably produce panic-like symptoms (e.g.,
sweating, shortness of breath) in the laboratory among both clinical (Seddon et al., 2011) and
non-clinical samples (Bailey, Argyropoulos, Kendrick, & Nutt, 2005). A number of stressinducing tasks have been used in the literature; however, the CO2 challenge has not been used in
the concordance/synchrony literature. We used this paradigm as a means to induce anxiety in a
non-clinical sample. Anxiety sensitivity (AS) and heart rate variability (HRV) were measured
prior to the experimental manipulation as individual differences in order to examine whether
they moderated the synchrony between an individuals’ heart rate (HR) and Subjective Units of
Distress (SUDS) ratings during the CO2 challenge task.
Review of the Literature
In the following review, the literature on the relationship between different behavioral,
autonomic, and self-report responding in emotional or stressful situations will be critically
examined. Next, an examination of the Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) article will be done in
order to identify different factors that may be contributing to the discrepant findings in the
concordance and synchrony literature. These will include individual differences, methodological
concerns, and theoretical considerations. Then, the inclusion of Lang’s (1979) bio-informational
theory will be explored as a potential assumption to describe the findings in the literature and as
a theory to adopt and use when examining these relationships. Anxiety sensitivity and heart rate
variability will be examined as potential individual differences that might affect synchrony
between self-report and heart rate response to the CO2 challenge. Specifically, the interoceptive
sensitivity hypothesis and the neurovisceral integration model will be described in relation to AS
and HRV respectively. Lastly, a review of the carbon dioxide challenge will be done in order to
justify its use in the present study as a paradigm that can reliably induce panic-like symptoms.

5

Synchrony/Desynchrony and Concordance/Discordance
The earliest literature examining concordance and synchrony between the “loosely
coupled” measures of emotion was done in the 1970s, in treatment outcome research. Grossberg
and Wilson (1968) instructed participants with phobias to visualize a personally frightening and
neutral scene. Only during the fear-provoking visualization was there concordance (r=.60)
between the group’s reported vividness of the imagined scenario and heart rate. Lang and
colleagues (1970) conducted a study examining concordance of physiological symptoms and
self-report of imagined fearful scenarios in a sample of individuals with social anxiety or spider
phobia. Results showed that heart rate and self-reported fear were related during imagined
scenarios of individuals’ own fear hierarchies, such that increases in heart rate were associated
with self-reported anxiety level (r=.52). Watson and colleagues (1972) examined heart rate and
self-reported fear in subjects with varying phobias, and participants were read fearful scripts
pertaining to their specific phobia. In subsequent trials, the individuals were exposed in-vivo to
their fear. There was discordance between heart rate, which decreased over sessions, and selfreported fear, which remained the same over sessions. Thus, a few of the early studies did find
concordance in samples of fairly anxious individuals. However, the subsequent literature has
been much more mixed.
For example, in a review of 49 studies that used the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST),
which involves subjects delivering a speech for a job interview and then completing an oral
serial subtraction in front of a group of “experts”, to examine concordance in individuals in a
laboratory setting, Campbell and Ehlert (2012) found generally weak concordance. Participants
are told that they will be videotaped and their performances will be evaluated by professionals
for presentation style and nonverbal behavior. Inclusion criteria for this review included use of
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the TSST or the TSST with slight variations, at least one measure of subjective experience, and
associations of physiological and subjective measures based on correlation or regression. Indices
of psychophysiology were salivary cortisol (61% of the studies); heart rate, systolic and diastolic
blood pressure (24% of the studies); plasma cortisol (18% of the studies); and plasma
adrenocorticotropic hormone (12% of the studies). Individuals’ subjective reports of emotion
were taken prior to the stress task as well as after its completion in 29% of the studies, after the
stress exposure in 29% of the studies, repeatedly during the course of the experimental procedure
in 24% of the studies, and in 20% of the studies a post and a pre-post assessment were combined.
There were overall weak associations between physiological measures and self-report, such that,
of the 30 studies using salivary cortisol in their study, only eight found significant correlations
between that measure and subjective emotion experience. Additionally, of the 12 studies that
assessed for heart rate and/or systolic and diastolic blood pressure, only three studies showed a
significant association between subjective stress and these cardiovascular measures, and
correlation coefficients showed a range between 0.3 and 0.5, which the authors describe as
“weak” associations. Campbell and Ehlert (2012) conclude that the response systems involved
with stress reactivity represent “multiple independently varying components”, and they cannot be
studied without taking moderating factors (e.g., emotion regulation, appraisal processes, social
desirability, and motivation) into account. Further, they posit that discordance may “…reflect a
normal reactivity pattern and/or results from various methodological issues”. They state that
certain factors that influence concordance include underlying psychological traits and states (e.g.,
emotion regulation, appraisal processes, social desirability, and motivational engagement).
Campbell and Ehlert (2012) state that consideration of these factors can help explain the different
patterns of responses and desynchrony within individuals.
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An important distinction in the concordance/synchrony literature is whether studies
examine both within-subjects and between-subjects or solely between-subjects relationships
between emotion systems. Alpers and Sell (2008) examined the relationship between heart rate
and self-reported fear both within- and between-subjects and evaluated whether
psychophysiological activation pre-treatment predicted treatment outcome in a group 10
claustrophobic patients by exposing them to small spaces. In order to calculate the interindividual correlations, the raw values of HR and self-reported fear during each session were
calculated. The results revealed that there was little concordance between individuals during six
sessions of exposure, and the correlations for the six sessions were rs = .27, .51, .53, .35, .33, and
.19 (interpreted as low concordance). The researchers also conducted intra-individual Pearson
correlations between the raw values of both heart rate and SUDS ratings across the six sessions,
and found a synchronous decrease in both heart rate and self-reported fear for six of the ten
participants across the six sessions. The mean z-score for the within-subjects correlation was .49
for these six participants, which the authors interpreted as a synchronous change. This is
important because it shows that only examining the between-subjects relationship between
variables ignores any within-subject variation that is present.
As noted previously, numerous studies have described the concordance/discordance and
synchrony/desynchrony that exists between emotional subsystems. Researchers believe that an
individuals’ self-report, physiological response, and behavior will be related based on the
canonical fear response. The varied results of the studies described do not completely support
this belief. The lack of consistent results in the literature have led some to suggest that one or
more factors are affecting the expected concordance and synchrony between emotional
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subsystems. The next section will review different factors that affect concordance and synchrony
and the implications these will have on this study.
Factors that Affect Concordance and Synchrony
Individual Differences. Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) offer three explanations for the
limited support for concordance that exists between emotional subsystems in research studies.
The first reason that Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) provide is the relative neglect of including
moderators in the research. They propose that inclusion of individual differences could show
different patterns of response systems within-subjects. Numerous studies that do not assess for
individuals’ regulatory processes and other individual differences may be ignoring important
information regarding how these factors affect the relationship between individuals’ physiology
and self-report. It is important to account for these differences because individuals who are better
at relaxing and modulating their heart rate may show a more desynchronous relationship between
heart rate and self-report. A number of studies have examined the role of emotion regulatory
processes on emotion systems, and found that emotion regulation affects the relationship
between individuals’ physiological and self-reported measures of emotion.
Previous research has shown that individuals who are instructed to regulate their
emotions are able to do so, with effects including decreasing their heart rate, increasing
sympathetic activation, and increasing blood pressure (Gross, 1998). These results suggest that
individuals can effectively use regulatory strategies to modulate their physiological response,
which can affect the synchrony between emotional subsystems. Dan-Glauser and Gross (2013)
studied an undergraduate sample to see the effects of how two types of suppression (expressive
and physiological) influence the relationship between emotion experience (participants used a
dial to self-report their degree of negative or positive feelings), emotion-expressive behavior

9

(facial behavior), and autonomic responses (electrocardiography, blood pressure, finger pulse,
skin temperature, and respiration). Participants were randomized to three conditions and were
then instructed to observe positive and negative pictures. The conditions included: unregulated,
expressive suppression (“don’t show emotions”), or physiological suppression groups (“don’t
react”). Results showed that participants in both the expressive and physiological suppression
groups had significantly lower concordance between all three measures than the unregulated
condition.
Butler, Gross, and Barnard (2014) tested the effects of two different forms of emotion
regulation on participants’ subjective experience, expressive behavior, and physiology after
watching an emotionally arousing film and discussing the film with other participants assigned to
different emotion regulation conditions. Participants were either assigned to an uninstructed
control group, a suppression group, or a reappraisal group, and partners were randomly assigned
after watching the film clip. After the conversations, participants watched the recorded video of
themselves and used a dial ranging from “positive”, “neutral”, and “negative” to continuously
rate how they remembered feeling during the conversation (emotion experience). A blind coder
was used to code each of the participants’ videos for positive and negative emotion expressions
(emotion expression). Results showed that, compared with the uninstructed condition,
participants in the suppression condition (e.g., those instructed to behaviorally not show any
emotion) showed lower concordance for emotion experience and inter-beat interval, emotion
experience and both negative and positive expression, and inter-beat interval and both negative
and positive emotion expression. Compared with the uninstructed group, the reappraisal
condition (e.g., those instructed to reevaluate the situation more positively) showed lower
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concordance for experience and negative expression and inter-beat interval and negative
expression.
Regulatory processes are not the only moderators that have been shown to affect and
potentially “disrupt” synchrony. Peasley-Miklus, Panayiotou, and Vrana (2016) conducted a
study to assess processing of imagined emotional stimuli in students who endorsed a range of
alexithymia traits. Alexithymia is characterized by difficulties with identification and
communication of emotions and an external thinking style, and it is believed to exist on a
continuum in the general population (Parker, Keefer, Taylor, & Bagby, 2008). Participants in the
study were read a script that pertained to a specific emotion (anger, fear, joy, neutral, action) and
were asked to continue to imagine the scene after the script was read. Participants went through
two trials for each emotion, for a total of 10 trials. Results supported the authors’ hypotheses that
those who endorsed more alexithymic traits would show desynchrony between their
physiological and self-report experience of the emotional scenarios, such that the strength of the
relationship between arousal and heart rate was weaker as alexithymia increased. These results
provide evidence of the role individual differences in emotion regulation play in synchrony.
Another individual difference that may affect synchrony between emotion subsystems is
physical fitness and respiratory health. Salmon (2001) and Schlicht (1994) state that physical
fitness could have differential effects on individuals’ physiological reactivity, resulting in
desynchrony between expressed emotion and physiology. For example, individuals who
exercise regularly may have a lower resting heart rate than individuals who lead a more
sedentary lifestyle, and these physically active individuals may be more likely to exhibit a
consistent heart rate over time, even during distressing scenarios. Further, Sze and colleagues
(2010) posit that individuals who are trained in different levels of body awareness (Vipassana
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meditators, modern and ballet dancers, and controls) may exhibit different levels of awareness
towards their bodies and show greater synchrony if they have more training in body awareness. It
was hypothesized that there would be greater synchrony between subjective experience and heart
period in the meditators, followed by the dancers, and then the control group. Emotional states
were induced by having participants watch intensely negative, intensely positive, and neutral
film clips. Results supported the researchers’ hypotheses, and the individuals who exhibited
greater body awareness showed greater synchrony between their heart period and self-reported
experience of emotion within-subjects.
Based on these results, it is clear that emotion regulatory strategies and other individual
differences affect the degree of synchrony between psychophysiological and self-report
measures. For the purpose of this study, AS and HRV will be examined as individual differences.
Based on the literature for these two individual differences summarized later in this literature
review, it is hypothesized that higher AS and higher HRV will each be associated with greater
synchrony between HR and SUDS.
Methodological Concerns. The second explanation that Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014)
offer are specific methodological concerns that may be negatively affecting the examination of
synchrony and concordance. The authors state that studies examining synchrony or concordance
may not be using paradigms that are adequately eliciting emotions. It has been suggested that
high intensity, basic emotions such as fear may elicit more concordant responses than general
emotional states (Friedman, Stephens, & Thayer, 2014). Levenson (1994) bases this on the
assumption of the discrete emotions theory and the idea that there is a set of basic emotions that
evolved and served the adaptive function of survival in fight or flight scenarios. Because these
emotions are thought to serve an adaptive function, it is believed that the emotion systems must
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be concordant in order for individuals to survive. Reisenzein (2000) adds that an additional
reason for low correlation among emotion responses may be measurement method factors. For
example, in their review of 49 studies examining the relationship between psychophysiology and
subjective experience of emotion, Campbell and Ehlert (2012) report that in 58% of these studies
self-report of emotional state were either collected both pre- and post-stressor or only a single
assessment post-stressor. Because emotional state can change so rapidly and retrospective bias
could cloud individuals’ reports, measurements of subjective emotion only before or afterwards
reduce the amount of concordance found.
An additional methodological consideration that is offered is the method with which the
data are analyzed. Most studies use a between-subjects approach in order to analyze concordance
of emotional response. Reisenzein (2000) contends that a within-subjects approach is more
appropriate because this method of analysis controls for “…factors that could in previous studies
have lowered the correlations among the components…”. Highlighted previously, Alpers and
Sell (2008) examined both the between- and within-subjects relationships. The between-subjects
analysis of heart rate and self-reported fear yielded non-significant small to medium size
correlations, but the within-subject correlations were significant within and across sessions,
indicating a synchronous change.
Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kröger (2014) state that within-subjects designs allow
researchers to test theories at the individual level. The data analysis methods used are important
because of the effects that individual differences have on the relationship between physiology
and self-report. A between-subjects design poses issues for detecting these individual differences
because it does not parse out individual variability, which has been shown to affect the
relationship between self-report and physiology when within-subjects analyses are used
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(Hollenstein and Lanteigne, 2014). A within-subjects analysis of the data would take into
account individual differences that exist between-subjects. For example, an individual with
higher AS may be more likely to react with distress to a CO2 challenge than someone with lower
AS. This may skew the results because a between-subjects approach does not accommodate for
the individual differences that may influence how synchronous an individual’s emotional
systems may be. Using a within-subjects analysis allows researchers to account for differences
that may have an effect on the synchrony of a relationship between emotion systems. A goal of
this study is to use a within-subjects approach in order to examine the effects that AS and HRV
have on each individuals’ relationship between HR and SUDS. A multi-level modeling (MLM)
approach will be used in order to examine these relationships.
Theoretical Considerations. A third concern is that the theoretical assumptions behind the
concordance literature may not be consistent with current theoretical views of emotion.
Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) propose that based on widely-accepted theories of emotion, it
can be assumed that an emotion is experienced and an individual responds coherently to said
emotion. Based on this model, different measures of emotion should be concordant with the
unobservable experience of emotion, and therefore the different measures of emotion should be
concordant with each other. However, there is no way to know if an individual is experiencing an
emotion. Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) state that, “…concordance is still seen as important,
yet only as a bottom-up process through which we can discover functional combinations via
inductive rather than deductive inquiry”. The authors believe that a more advisable way to
examine concordance would be to use “inductive inquiry” and observe relationships between
different “observables” rather than assume that because a specific emotion is being elicited that
these observables should have a relationship.
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Taking Hollenstein and Lanteigne’s (2014) argument into account, the bio-informational
theory proposed by Lang (1979) provides an explanation for the discordant results of emotion
systems. Lang (1979) proposes that concordance is not guaranteed because measures of selfreport, physiology, and behavior are relatively independent. Lang draws upon the perceptual and
emotional imagery literature and describes the process by which individuals experience and
interpret an emotional event. Lang (1979) describes three types of propositions, defined as “a
general abstract form of representation [that is] not limited to semantic knowledge”, that play a
role in one’s emotion memory network. The first type is a stimulus proposition, which involves
the stimulus characteristics of the memory. This could include information about the event, the
context, and the situation. The second type is the response proposition, and this includes any
behavioral or physiological response that is evoked by the stimulus. The last proposition is the
meaning proposition. This involves attributing meaning to the emotional mental representation
for the individual. When an emotional memory is processed, all three types of propositions are
accessed through spreading activation. Response propositions are particularly important because
they are direct efferent activity. For example, if one is in a dark alley and hears menacing noises,
the response proposition may involve running, and heart rate and muscle tension in the legs will
automatically increase to support the behavioral activity. In a research study that involves
imagining this situation, these response propositions would automatically be activated,
increasing heart rate and muscle tension even though the final behavioral output (running) does
not occur. If an individual experiences a fear-eliciting situation, the mental image created by that
event will generate a different reaction depending upon the varied propositions that are involved
in the network
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Friedman and colleagues (2014) state that the propositions for a response for each
subsystem (e.g., physiological, self-report, and behavioral) may not be activated simultaneously
when accessing an emotional image; thus concordance should not be expected. Lang (1979)
stated that how much of the network is activated depends on the stimulus that is activating the
network and on the strength of association between the propositions. There are individual
differences that affect the efferent output of each individual, such that some individuals may
have high coherence between response propositions and others may have low coherence
resulting in discordance between measures.
The findings from the synchrony and concordance literature described above show that
finding a synchronous or concordant relationship between a physiological and self-report
measure is difficult, and Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) suggest three different explanations
about why this is so. One of the most important explanations is that individual differences may
obscure relationships between physiological and self-reported response to emotion. The primary
goal of this study is to examine individual differences that may be affecting the relationship
between physiology and self-report. This study examined whether anxiety sensitivity and heart
rate variability affect the degree of synchrony within-subjects. The next sections of this paper
review these two variables and the role they may have in affecting the synchrony of HR and
SUDS during a carbon dioxide challenge.
Anxiety Sensitivity
Anxiety sensitivity is defined as the fear of anxiety and other anxiety-related sensations
and the effects that these symptoms may have on an individual (Reiss and McNally, 1985).
Anxiety pathology is often characterized by a psychological vulnerability-stress model (Alloy,
Kelly, Mineka, & Clements, 1990). This model theorizes that certain psychological
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vulnerabilities heighten the risk for maladaptive anxious and fearful responding. Anxiety
sensitivity is a well-documented risk factor for fearful responding. The Anxiety Sensitivity Index
is meant to assess individuals’ concern over their physiological symptoms by asking questions
such as, “It scares me when I feel shaky” and “It scares me when I become short of breath”.
Thus, the Anxiety Sensitivity Index is an appropriate tool to use in challenges that induce
hyperventilation and related symptoms because “…the physiological challenge may be more
related to primary appraisals related to evaluating bodily sensations…” (Zvolensky et al., 2002).
Anxiety sensitivity is related to synchrony between self-report and heart rate because AS
“[amplifies] anxious and fearful responding to potentially anxiety-evoking stimuli” (Taylor and
Cox, 1998), and it has been shown to affect the relationship between psychophysiological
response and self-reported distress (Zvolensky et al., 2002). In their study, Zvolensky and
colleagues (2002) hypothesized that AS would be a better predictor of emotional response to the
hyperventilation challenge than perceived stress. Results supported this hypothesis. Scores on the
ASI accounted for 12% of the variance predicting post-challenge SUDS ratings. Additionally,
higher scores on the ASI were associated with higher SUDS ratings, and a t-test revealed that
there was a statistically significant change in HR and SUDS ratings from baseline to postchallenge in the hyperventilation task. Thus, it would be expected that individuals who are at a
heightened risk to respond anxiously to a stimulus are likely to respond synchronously because
this amplification of fearful responding would occur in both physiology and self-report. In our
study we expect that individuals with higher anxiety sensitivity will exhibit a synchronous
relationship between HR and SUDS within-subjects.
Stewart and colleagues (2001) describe the interoceptive sensitivity hypothesis, which
states that “…nonclinical high AS individuals are characterized by an enhanced ability to
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accurately detect arousal-related bodily sensations”, and that individuals with increased anxiety
sensitivity will experience arousal-related somatic sensations and respond with anxiety (Ehlers,
1993). The study conducted by Stewart and colleagues (2001) examined the effects of anxiety
sensitivity on heartbeat awareness and heart rate reactivity in a nonclinical sample. It was
hypothesized that individuals with high AS would show greater increases in stress-induced heart
rate and would be more aware of their heartbeat compared with the low AS group. Results
showed that there were no differences in heart rate reactivity between the two groups, but the
high AS group was significantly more accurate in predicting their actual heart rates.
These results suggest that individuals with high AS are better able to estimate their heart
rate than individuals with low AS, and this supports the interoceptive sensitivity hypothesis.
Sturges and Goetsch (1996) report that individuals who are more fearful of interoceptive
symptoms are likely to be more motivated to monitor these symptoms. Based on these results, it
is hypothesized that individuals with high AS will be more likely to self-report higher distress
when their heart rate is higher, because they will be more attuned to their heart rate. Thus,
individuals with higher AS will exhibit a more synchronous relationship between HR and SUDS
because they will be paying more attention to their symptoms.
Heart Rate Variability
Chalmers, Quintana, Abbott, and Kemp (2014) state that heart rate variability (HRV) is
“the fluctuation of heart period over time…and is an important marker of psychological wellbeing”. It is argued that “HRV reflects the degree to which cardiac activity can be modulated to
meet changing situational demands” and is influenced by both the autonomic nervous system and
the central autonomic network (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). Porges (2007) describes the
relationship between emotion regulation and HRV and states that “individuals with low HRV
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have increased difficulties in emotion regulation in contexts requiring it”. Based on the role that
emotion regulation plays in adapting to different situations, it is hypothesized that individuals
with higher HRV will show a more synchronous relationship between HR and self-reported
distress because those with higher HRV may have better emotion regulation and will respond
more adaptively than an individual with lower HRV.
Laborde, Lautenbach, and Allen (2015) state that “effective emotional functioning
reflects an effective way of coping with stressful situations”. They cite the neurovisceral
integration model (Thayer & Lane, 2000), which postulates that the self-regulatory responses of
emotions allow for “an optimal functioning of a broad range of regulatory functions serving
goal-directed behaviors”. This model is similar to the canonical fear response because all three
systems of emotion ideally work together to respond adaptively. Thayer and Lane (2000) assert
that disorders of affect “…may be viewed as a kind of distorted emotional state space in which
an individual is unable to shift into an emotion that is appropriate for a given set of
environmental demands”. HRV is a measure of self-regulation that provides information
regarding how adaptively one responds to one’s environment (Porges, 1991). Thayer and Lane
(2000) propose that “measures of cardiac vagal tone (e.g., HRV) index the efficiency of centralperipheral neural feedback mechanisms”. Based on this model, an individual with higher HRV,
which is associated with the ability to self-regulate, will more adaptively respond in a distressing
situation that requires response, so their heart rate will tend to go up. Conversely, individuals
with lower HRV will show poor self-regulation and decreased behavioral flexibility when faced
with a stress-provoking situation. This may result in no heart rate change or decreased heart rate
even in distressing situations requiring an adaptive response. Thus, it is hypothesized that
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individuals with higher HRV will show a more synchronous relationship between HR and SUDS
during the CO2 challenge.
Carbon Dioxide Challenge
Carbon dioxide (CO2) challenge tasks have historically been employed as a means to
induce panic symptoms (Rassovsky & Kushner, 2003). Although this paradigm is generally used
to understand panic symptomatology in panic disorder (Rassovsky & Kushner, 2003), it has been
used as an experimental tool to examine other anxiety disorders (Seddon et al., 2011) and nonclinical samples due to its ability to induce physiological reactivity. For example, Forsyth, Eifert,
and Canna (2000) showed that by using a repeated 20% CO2 inhalation procedure, 55.2% of the
healthy volunteers responded with symptoms similar to a panic attack. Further, among 20 nonclinical participants who inhaled 7.5% CO2 for a duration of 20 minutes (Bailey et al., 2005),
systolic blood pressure and heart rate were significantly increased. These results suggest that the
CO2 challenge is an appropriate paradigm to use in order to increase physiological arousal and
distress in non-clinical samples.
Studies employing the CO2 challenge have used a range of gas concentrations from 7%
CO2 to 35%. Rassovsky and Kushner (2003) state that the 35% concentration is likely to evoke
more immediate panic symptoms that are short-lasting because the dose is higher. Because this
study is interested in lower level of anxiety symptoms that increases over time in order to
examine individual differences in response to these symptoms, a 7.5% CO2 concentration will be
used to induce anxiety symptoms for this study.
Statement of Problem
Studies examining the relationship between self-reported emotion and physiology have
not consistently found concordance between these variables. Researchers have sought
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explanations for why concordance is not found consistently, and Hollenstein and Lanteigne
(2014) consider the methodology, theory, and the disregard of examination of individual
differences to be major factors affecting the results, and they reason that addressing these
concerns would yield more concordant relationships between variables. Most researchers have
examined concordance using between-subjects data analyses, but there seems to be more
evidence that supports examining synchrony, a within-subjects effect.
This study examines individual differences in synchrony by analyzing the effects that AS
and HRV have on the relationship between HR and SUDS. Lanteigne, Flynn, Eastabrook, and
Hollenstein (2014) state that “the within-subjects approach allows for better understanding of
how an individual’s concordance or discordance relates to individual difference factors”. It is
predicted that individuals with higher AS will be more likely to self-report higher distress when
their heart rate is higher, because they will be more attuned to their heart rate. Additionally, it is
hypothesized that individuals with higher HRV, which is associated with the ability to selfregulate, will more adaptively respond in a distressing situation that requires response, so their
heart rate and self-reported distress will increase. Thus, both higher AS and higher baseline HRV
will be related to both greater synchrony between heart rate and self-reported distress during a
CO2 challenge.
Research Hypotheses
(1) Higher SUDS will predict higher heart rate between-subjects
(2) Higher SUDS will predict higher heart rate within-subjects.
(3) There will be greater synchrony within-subjects between HR and SUDS for those who are
higher on anxiety sensitivity.
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(4) There will be greater synchrony within-subjects between HR and SUDS for participants with
higher baseline HRV.
Method
Participants
Data were analyzed using participants from a larger study that was designed to examine
how anxiety-related control attributions predicts anxious responses during multiple sessions of a
biological stressor (Gorlin, Beadel, Roberson-Nay, & Teachman, 2014). This study examined the
effect that HRV and ASI have on the relationship between HR and SUDS during Session 1 of the
biological stressor from the larger study. Participants (N = 294, 58.6% female, 54.8% Caucasian)
were recruited from undergraduate samples at two large universities in the American Southeast
who participated in exchange for course credit or financial compensation. The average age of
participants was 19.8 years (range = 18-49 years). Participants were recruited based on
completion of a department-wide preselection survey (e.g., SONA), or via recruitment flyers
posted on each university’s campus. Following previously used standard health-based exclusions
for employing the maintained CO2 inhalation procedure (Garner, Attwood, Baldwin, James, &
Munafo, 2011), participants were excluded from the study if they reported any of the following:
asthma or a serious, unstable medical condition, past or current episodes of psychosis, or having
taken an antidepressant or other psychotropic medication within the past 4 weeks.
Procedure
Informed consent was obtained from all participants included in the study. During
informed consent, participants were told that they would be asked to complete a breathing task
that may potentially produce some anxiety. To avoid priming participants with panic-related
expectancies that might confound their baseline responses, they were informed that they would
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receive more information about the breathing procedure after completing these baseline
measures. After completing a baseline SUDS rating, participants completed a battery of
measures administered in randomized order. Next, participants were provided greater detail
about the CO2 challenge, including a full description of the steps involved in the procedure and
the possibility of experiencing panic-related effects. Once participants consented to the breathing
task, the experimenter attached the facemask and electrodes and re-administered the SUDS to
obtain measures of anxious responding during the pre-CO2 Anticipatory phase. Note, this phase
occurred following attachment of the mask, a potentially anxiety-provoking stimulus in its own
right, but prior to administration of the CO2 gas. During the task, participants sat in a
comfortable chair and breathed through a silicone facemask that covered their nose and mouth.
The mask was connected via gas impermeable tubing to a two-way stopcock valve, allowing the
experimenter to manually switch from room air to the CO2 mixture. Once attached to the
facemask, participants breathed regular room air for 5 minutes, followed by 8 minutes of 7.5 %
CO2 enriched air, followed by a 5-minute room air recovery before the mask was removed. The
reservoir and stopcock valve were hidden behind a partition, and participants were not informed
when the CO2 enriched air was being turned on and off. SUDS ratings were then obtained once
every two minutes throughout the CO2 challenge task. Following the post-CO2 Anticipatory
phase, the facemask was removed. If participants’ final SUDS rating was greater than 20 points
above their baseline level, participants were given a deep breathing exercise to ensure that
participants were not leaving the experiment feeling panicked. The description of these methods
were adapted from Gorlin and colleagues (2014) and readers should consult this research study
for more complete methods.
Measures
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Anxiety Sensitivity Index. Prior to beginning the CO2 Challenge task, participants
completed the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI). The ASI (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally,
1986) is a 16-item measure that assesses an individual’s tendency to fear sensations or symptoms
associated with anxiety (e.g., ‘‘It scares me when I become short of breath’’) on a 5-point Likert
scale (0 = ‘‘Very little’’ to 4 = ‘‘Very much’’). This tendency is thought to reflect beliefs about
the terrible consequences linked to anxiety symptoms. AS is considered a dispositional trait that
increases fear and other anxious responding. The ASI is broken down into three lower-order
factors: (1) fear of somatic symptoms, (2) fear of loss of cognitive control, and (3) fear of
publicly observable anxiety symptoms (Zinbarg, Mohlman, & Hong, 1999). The scale has high
internal consistency and good test–retest reliability (Peterson & Reiss, 1992).
Other instruments that were administered to participants include The Anxiety-Specific
Attributions of Control scale—External Subscale (ASAC-Ext; Ginsburg and Drake, 1998) and
The Diagnostic Symptom Questionnaire (DSQ; Sanderson et al., 1989) for Physical Panic
Symptoms and (State) Threat Cognitions. However, they are not included in the current analyses
and so will not be discussed further.
Heart Rate. All physiological data were collected using a Biopac data acquisition unit
(Biopac Systems Inc., US). Heart rate was collected using a two-lead electrocardiogram (ECG)
with lead placement on both wrists. The data were sampled at a rate of 1,000 Hz. Means of heart
rate for each minute throughout the 18 minutes of breathing through the mask were calculated,
and the minute of HR that followed each SUDS rating was used in the analyses. For example, the
SUDS rating taken at minute two was paired with the HR from minute two to three, the SUDS
rating at minute four was matched with the HR from minute four to five, etc.
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Heart Rate Variability. HRV was calculated from the interbeat interval series using the
Cardiac Metric (CMet) program. HRV was operationalized as the log of the variance of the IBI
series (Allen, Chambers, & Towers, 2007). Data from the period before the CO2 gas was
administered were used to create the measure of HRV.
Other physiological measures that were collected during this study but are not included in
the current analyses so will not be discussed further include skin conductance (SC) and
respiratory rate (RR).
Subjective Distress. The Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969) is a
verbally-administered rating scale used to index self-reported fear, on a scale ranging from 0 (no
fear) to 100 (extreme fear). SUDS ratings were collected 11 times throughout the experiment to
examine individuals’ self-reported fear. SUDS ratings were taken twice before the CO2 gas
mixture was administered. One was measured prior to the face mask and electrode placement,
and the second was taken after the face mask and electrodes had been placed on the participant.
The remaining nine SUDS ratings were taken at the end of every two minutes for the entirety of
the CO2 challenge (e.g., 5 minutes of baseline breathing room air, 8 minutes of breathing 35%
CO2 air, and 5 minutes of post-CO2 breathing room air). In order to examine how SUDS
predicts HR within-subjects, SUDS ratings were paired with the average HR during the minute
following the rating. For example, the SUDS rating taken after the mask had been placed on the
participants corresponded to the first minute of HR, SUDS at minute two corresponds to the
mean of minute three of HR, etc. Only these nine measures of SUDS were used in the current
analyses.
Analytic Strategies
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We analyzed a correlation matrix in order to determine the degree of concordance
between HR and SUDS. This was calculated by identifying the highest SUDS for each subject
and correlating that with each subjects’ corresponding HR. This correlation was evaluated with a
one-tailed test because we hypothesize that higher SUDS will correspond with higher HR, e.g., a
positive correlation. If the correlation between maximum SUDS and the corresponding HR is
positive and statistically significant, this will support the hypothesis that individuals’ HR and
SUDS are concordant.
Multilevel modeling is appropriate to use when participant data are nested within
individuals. For our study, repeated measurements of HR and SUDS represent Level 1, and the
differences at the individual level represent Level 2. Because repeated observations of HR and
psychological distress (Level 1) were nested within individuals with different levels of AS and
HRV (Level 2), multilevel modeling analyses were employed (Kahn, 2011). The analyses
proceeded in three steps. In order to test our hypotheses, a series of multilevel models were run
(see Results section for details) in HLM 7 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2013). The
likelihood-ratio difference test (Wilks, 1938) was run after each new model in order to determine
whether the current model fit the data better than the previous one. A significant coefficient from
the likelihood-ratio difference test at the appropriate 𝜒 2 critical value, and a statistically
significant t statistic indicates that our hypotheses related to synchrony were supported.
We used indices of effect size to quantify the degree to which AS and HRV predict
concordance and synchrony between HR and SUDS. This was done by calculating 𝑅 21 and 𝑅 2 2
for Levels 1 and 2, respectively (Snijders & Bosker, 1994). These effect sizes allow us to analyze
how our ability to predict HR stemming from individual sources is enhanced by including our
predictors (SUDS, HR, and AS). This calculation was computed at each step of the model in
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order to see how much percent reduction in mean square error the addition of our predictor
variables explain at Level 1 and Level 2 at each step of the model.
Results
Concordance Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1)
A correlation was calculated between the highest SUDS for each subject and the
corresponding HR (see scatterplot; Figure 1). This is based on the definition of concordance
provided by Rachman and Hodgson (1974), as the correlation between the two variables across
subjects at a particular point. This correlation was evaluated with a one-tailed test because we
hypothesized a positive correlation between higher SUDS and higher HR. The correlation
relating HR and SUDS was positive, as expected, but not statistically significant r (238) = .093,
though it approaches significance (p<.08) given the directional hypothesis. Thus there is no
evidence in support of hypothesis 1 that there will be concordance between HR and SUDS.
Synchrony Hypotheses (Hypotheses 2-4)
All models are included in Table 1. Table 1 shows estimates, standard errors, and t
statistics between the study variables.
An unconditional model was run in order to examine the amount of variance that is
present within- and between-participants in order to determine whether MLM is appropriate to
use. HR was specified as our outcome variable. This variance was calculated by dividing the
between-group variance by the total variance. If there was at least some individual-level criterion
variance, MLM was appropriate to use. We divided the variance between groups (97.87) by total
variance (140.23). Thus, 97.87 / 140.23 = 0.697. This suggests that 69.7% of the variance in HR
is present between individuals, and we have evidence for variance both within- and between-
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participants, and that MLM is appropriate to use. Additionally, this suggests that there is more
variance in HR between individuals than within individuals.
Effect sizes were calculated after each step of the model in order to examine whether the
current model fits the data better than the previous model and explains additional variance at
Level 1 and Level 2. 𝑅 21 was calculated by summing the estimate of variance within-subjects
(𝜎 2 ) and the estimate of variance between-subjects (𝜏00 ) for the current model and dividing that
by the sum of the estimate of variance within-subjects (𝜎 2 ) and the estimate of variance betweensubjects (𝜏00 ) for the previous model. This calculation was subtracted from 1 and corresponds to
increase in percent of variance explained at Level 1 due to the addition of a new variable added
to the current model at Level 1. 𝑅 2 2 was calculated by first dividing the estimate of variance
within-subjects for the current model (𝜎 2 ) by n, which equals the number of Level 1
observations per subject. This number was added to the estimate of variance between-subjects
(𝜏00 ) for the current model. The denominator summed the estimate of variance within-subjects
for the previous model (𝜎 2 ) divided by n and the estimate of variance between-subjects (𝜏00 ) for
the previous model. This number was then subtracted from 1 and provides an estimate that
corresponds to increase in percent of variance in HR explained by including our Level 2
variables, AS and HRV, in our model.
In order to test our second hypothesis, a random coefficients (Model 2 in Table 1) model
was run. Our Level 1 outcome was HR, and we entered SUDS. SUDS was entered person-mean
centered because this centering strategy statistically controls for inter-individual differences that
may affect individuals’ HR (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). We then calculated the likelihood-ratio
difference test in order to show this model fits the data better than the unconditional model
(Wilks, 1938). The likelihood-ratio difference test was calculated by subtracting the “Deviance”
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of the second model from the “Deviance” of the unconditional model. Entry of SUDS yielded a
statistically significant improvement in model fit, difference of -2 log likelihood = 1,146.89,
coefficient = 0.15, S.E. = .01, t = 15.15, p < .01, 𝑅 21 = .05 and 𝑅 2 2 = .015. Since the difference of
-2 log likelihood exceeded a 𝜒 2 critical value of d.f.(1) = 3.84, we rejected the null hypothesis
and inferred that the model that includes SUDS (Model 2) fits the data better than the model with
no predictors (unconditional model). Because the t statistic for SUDS predicting HR is positive
and statistically significant, we have evidence to suggest that SUDS is predictive of withinsubject variance in HR over time. .05 corresponds to the amount of variance that is accounted for
at Level 1 due to the addition of SUDS, and .015 corresponds to the amount of variance that is
accounted for at Level 2 due to the addition of SUDS. This supports our second hypothesis that
higher SUDS predicts higher HR within-subjects and provides evidence for synchrony between
HR and SUDS.
In order to test the fit of our third model, AS and HRV were entered as predictors of the
intercept. This model assumes that the slope between SUDS – HR is fixed across individuals
(Culpepper & Aguinis, 2011) and provides information regarding between-subject variance in
HR that is not accounted for by SUDS (Schwartz & Stone, 1998). Consistent with the
recommendations of Aguinis and colleagues (2013), AS and HRV were entered as grand-mean
centered predictors of HR. Entry of these predictors into the intercept equation did not yield a
statistically significant improvement in model fit compared to Model 2, difference of -2 log
likelihood = 4.01, 𝑅 21 = .0118 and 𝑅 2 2 = .016. The results for each of the predictors include,
coefficient = .03, S.E. = .07, t = -.5, p = .62 for AS, coefficient = 1.83, S.E. = .74, t = -2.46, p =
.015 for HRV, and coefficient = .15, S.E. = .01, t = 15.15, p < .01 for SUDS. Because the 𝜒 2
value of d.f.(2) = 4.01 does not exceed the critical value = 5.99, this model overall did not fit the
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data better than the model that only included SUDS as a predictor of HR. However, HRV was
statistically significant at p < .05. This suggests that HRV is predictive of inter-individual
differences in HR (e.g., higher HRV corresponds to lower HR), but AS is not a significant
predictor of HR.
To test our third and fourth hypotheses, we tested for slope variation in the HR–SUDS
relationship across individuals. Freeing the slope (e.g., allowing the slope to vary across
individuals; see Model 4 in Table 1) yielded a statistically significant improvement in model fit
compared to the model that included HRV and AS as predictors of the intercept (Model 3),
difference of -2 log likelihood = 72.25, p < .01, 𝑅 21 = .03 and 𝑅 2 2 = -.006, suggesting that the
nature of the HR–SUDS relationship varied across individuals. Because we met this criterion, we
then tested our cross-level interaction terms in order to examine whether there was greater
synchrony between HR and SUDS for those who have higher AS (hypothesis 3) and higher
baseline HRV (hypothesis 4). AS and HRV (grand-mean centered) were entered simultaneously
as cross-level predictors of the slope and failed to yield a statistically significant improvement in
model fit for AS, difference of -2 log likelihood = -16.23, coefficient = -.0002, S.E. = .002, t = .10, p = .92, and HRV, coefficient = -.02, S.E. = .02, t = -.82, p = .41, 𝑅 21 = .08 and 𝑅 2 2 = .03
when compared to the model that allowed the slope to vary across individuals (Model 4).
Because the coefficients for each predictor was very small, we do not have evidence to suggest
that there is a stronger relationship between HR and SUDS for individuals who have higher AS
or higher HRV, and thus there was no evidence that AS and HRV are individual differences that
predict synchrony.
Discussion
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Studies have long examined the relationship between self-reported emotion and
physiology during emotional situations (Alpers & Sell, 2008; Campbell & Ehlert, 2012; Watson,
et al., 1972). This study analyzed the relationship between HR and SUDS during a CO2
challenge and tested whether these variables were concordant and synchronous and whether AS
and HRV predicted a synchronous relationship between HR and SUDS. Our study did not
support hypothesis 1 of concordance between HR and SUDS, but did find that HR and SUDS
were synchronous (hypothesis 2). Emotion theories (Darwin, 1872; Levenson, 1994) propose
that emotion systems will exhibit synchrony as an individual responds adaptively to an emotioninducing situation. Further, the literature has shown that when participants are instructed to
modulate their responses, this instructed emotion regulation affects the relationship between selfreport and physiology (Dan-Glauser & Gross, 2013; Gross, 1998). The results from these studies
suggest that when examined, naturally occurring differences in emotion regulation (e.g., trait
differences) may reliably affect synchrony in a similar way. The current study tested the effect
individual differences have on synchrony, and found no evidence for either AS or HRV as
predictors of a synchronous relationship between HR and SUDS (hypotheses 3 and 4). The
following discussion reviews the literature, describes the implications of our study, and explores
potential limitations and future directions for the synchrony/concordance literature.
Concordance (Hypothesis 1)
Our study did not find a statistically significant relationship between HR and SUDS, and
thus failed to find evidence that the two are concordant. Our results fall in line with the mixed
findings of the concordance literature (Barrett, 2006). Some studies have found concordance
(Grossberg & Wilson, 1968; Lang, et al., 1970; Mauss et al., 2005), and a number of studies
using the same parameters have not found concordance (Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Öhman,
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1987; Telch, Valentiner, Ilai, Petruzzi, & Hehmsoth, 2000). Although no studies to our
knowledge have examined concordance using a CO2 challenge, concordance studies that used
other biological and social stressors have, like our study, not found concordance. For example,
Campbell and Ehlert (2012) conducted a review examining the relationship between physiology
and self-report of participants during a social stressor. Of the 12 studies that examined the
relationship between heart rate and self-reported emotion, only three studies showed a significant
association between subjective stress and heart rate.
Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) contend that the components of the emotion system
that are selected for tests of concordance are important. The authors suggest that associations
between self-reported experience and behavioral expression have been the strongest, while
pairings that include physiological variables have been the most inconsistent (Evers et al., 2014;
Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Further,
Bulteel et al. (2014) argue that concordance is a “three-component process” (e.g., physiology,
self-report, behavior) and solely using correlations for two components reflects “methodological
limitations rather than a strong theoretical prediction that concordance should be bivariate”.
However, even when studies examine all three, results show that self-reported emotion and facial
behavioral indices were related but physiological response was not as strongly correlated when
amusement and sadness were elicited (Mauss et al., 2005). This finding should be interpreted
with the knowledge that behavioral indices are more personally perceptible than physiological
measures, and thus allows behavioral measures to more easily affect self-reports; further, both
self report and behavior are more susceptible to social influence. The results found by Mauss and
colleagues (2005) lend support to the idea that concordance between self-report and behavior is
more likely to be present because “externalized processes such as facial expressions are more
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obviously subject to forces of socialization…than are the internalized processes of visceral,
humoral, or immunological responses” (Cacioppo, Uchino, et al., 1992, p. 110) and could
explain why concordance is not always found when three response systems are measured.
Although most studies that examine the relationship between emotion systems
hypothesize concordance between emotion systems, the bio-informational theory proposed by
Lang (1979) argues that concordance should not necessarily be expected, because measures of
self-report, physiology, and behavior are relatively independent entities. Friedman and
colleagues (2014) state that the response for each subsystem (e.g., physiological, self-report, and
behavioral) may not be activated simultaneously when accessing an emotional memory; thus
concordance should not be expected. Lang (1979) proposes that how much of the network of an
emotional memory is activated depends on the stimulus that is activating the network and on the
strength of association between the propositions in the network. This can help explain the mixed
findings in the concordance literature. Specifically, the seminal concordance studies that have
found evidence for concordance have, for the most part, used a clinical sample and emotionally
salient imagery for each participant (see Grossberg & Wilson, 1968; Lang, et al., 1970). It may
be that concordance is less likely to be found in a non-clinical sample such as ours. The
bioinformational theory is consistent with this conjecture in that it proposes concordance should
be present when individuals experience strong emotions because subjective, behavioral, and
physiological responses should align more closely (Cannon, 1927; Darwin, 1872; Grossberg &
Wilson, 1968; James, 1884; Levenson, 1994).
Sze and colleagues (2010) provide an explanation for the inconsistent results found
within the literature, and state that two very different methods have been used to assess
concordance (Buck, 1980; Mauss et al., 2005). They indicate that most studies that examine
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emotion use a between-individual paradigm when a within-individual approach “…is much
closer to the theoretical accounts…” of emotion and is a more favorable method to use when
examining the relationship between emotion systems because these theories conceptualize
“…coherence [of emotion] as the extent to which responses become coordinated with each other
while the person is experiencing an emotion”. Based on the rationale provided by Sze and
colleagues (2010), we examined synchrony within-subjects for hypothesis 2.
Synchrony (Hypothesis 2)
Although our hypothesis related to concordance was not supported, the results supported
the hypothesized effects related to synchrony: HR was higher within-subjects when SUDS
ratings were also higher. This finding supports emotion theories that assert that emotional
responses will be synced together over time (Grossberg & Wilson, 1968; Levenson, 1994) and
provides support for the canonical fear response. Although not every study finds synchrony
(Allen et al., 2015), and only approximately 20 studies have examined synchrony between
emotion systems (Bulteel et al., 2014; Reisenzein, 2000; Sze et al., 2010), findings of synchrony
are more evident in the literature than findings of concordance.
When studies have examined both synchrony and concordance, results show that
synchrony is present and concordance is not. Alpers and Sell (2008) examined both the
between- and within-subjects relationships in a study that included 36 self-reported measures of
SUDS over six claustrophobia exposure sessions in a group of 10 participants with
claustrophobia. The between-subjects analysis of heart rate and self-reported fear yielded nonsignificant small to medium size correlations, but the within-subject correlations were significant
within and across sessions, indicating a synchronous change. Our results mirrored the results
from this study despite employing a non-clinical sample, different emotion-eliciting situations,
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and a single session. This suggests that synchrony may be robust to different methods and
samples even in contexts in which concordance is not found, and provides evidence that
synchrony is more prevalent in the literature. Further, Butler and colleagues (2014) examined
synchrony between three emotion systems and found that almost all of the variability occurred at
the within-subjects level. The emotion regulation conditions that participants had been assigned
explained a significant amount of variance, and the researchers reported no reason to continue
their analyses to examine the between-subjects level because there was not enough additional
variance to be explained between-subjects. This suggests that synchrony was present but
concordance was not and supports the finding that synchrony may be a stronger indicator of
emotion.
Reisenzein (2000) contends that a within-subjects approach examining synchrony is more
appropriate because this method of analysis controls for “…factors that could in previous studies
have lowered the correlations among the components…”. The results from our second
hypothesis support the notion proposed by Sze and colleagues (2010) that within-subjects
approaches more closely represent the synchronization of emotion systems over time as an
adaptive function, and that synchrony is a more robust index of emotion than concordance. A
within-subjects analysis allows for individual differences and other factors to be accounted for,
and the study described by Butler and colleagues (2014) provides evidence that individual
differences affect synchrony.
Individual Differences Affecting Synchrony (Hypotheses 3 and 4)
Because the majority of studies in the synchrony literature have not examined individual
differences, and Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) identified inclusion of individual differences
as a reason to explain the mixed results in the literature, hypotheses 3 and 4 examined the effects

35

that AS and HRV had on the relationship between HR and SUDS. Within-subjects analyses
allow an indication of individual variation in the extent of synchrony, and this approach allows
for examination of individual differences as predictors of that variability (Mauss et al., 2005). In
our study, however, higher HRV and AS were not supported as significant predictors of a more
synchronous relationship between HR and SUDS.
Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014) highlight the need for studies to examine the effects of
individual differences. However, most studies that examine individual differences thus far have
focused on examination of instructed emotion regulation strategies, rather than naturallyoccurring differences in individual traits. For example, Butler and colleagues (2014) tested the
effects of two different forms of emotion regulation instructions (expressive suppression and
positive reappraisal) on participants’ subjective experience, expressive behavior, and physiology
after watching an emotionally arousing film. The authors state that this analysis of synchrony
picks up differences between-subjects, “…as well as variance due to shared momentary
fluctuations, all of which reflect aspects of synchrony”. When testing their variables, Butler and
colleagues (2014) found that almost all of the variability occurred at the within-subjects level
(e.g., the emotion regulation conditions explained significant variance at this level), and both
expressive suppression and positive reappraisal resulted in greater synchrony between the
emotion systems than the control condition. This study supports the notion that individual
differences in emotion processing and regulation affect synchrony between emotion systems.
However, individual differences and how they affect one’s reaction to stress-inducing
stimuli may be better understood by examining trait differences and other individual differences
that participants naturally exhibit (Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014) better than instructed
regulatory conditions. For example, Rothbart and Rueda (2005) describe effortful control as a
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temperament construct that affects regulation. Individuals who are higher in effortful control
may be better at controlling their emotional response across systems, and so may exhibit greater
synchrony than another individual who is assigned to the same experimental condition. When
studies do not account for individuals’ natural tendencies and traits, important information
regarding why one participant shows a more synchronous response than another assigned to the
same condition is ignored. The only study to our knowledge to examine the effect of trait
differences on synchrony is Peasley-Miklus and colleagues (2016). Based on the literature
examining AS and HRV, we hypothesized that higher levels of our trait differences of AS and
HRV would predict a synchronous relationship between HR and SUDS.
Anxiety Sensitivity. We hypothesized that higher AS would predict greater synchrony
between HR and SUDS because the interoceptive sensitivity hypothesis states that
“…nonclinical high AS individuals are characterized by an enhanced ability to accurately detect
arousal-related bodily sensations” (Stewart et al., 2001, p. 537), and individuals with increased
anxiety sensitivity will experience arousal-related somatic sensations and respond with anxiety
(Ehlers, 1993). Stewart and colleagues (2001) examined the effects of anxiety sensitivity on
heartbeat awareness and heart rate reactivity in a nonclinical sample. The authors hypothesized
that individuals with high AS would be more aware of their heartbeat compared with the low AS
group. Results showed that there were no differences in heart rate reactivity between the two
groups, but the high AS group was significantly more accurate in predicting their actual heart
rates, supporting the interoceptive sensitivity hypothesis. Sturges and Goetsch (1996) report that
individuals who are more fearful of interoceptive symptoms are likely to be more motivated to
monitor these symptoms. Based on this study, we hypothesized that individuals with higher AS
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would show synchrony between HR and SUDS because they would be monitoring their HR
more closely and would self-report more distress to match higher HR.
Our results did not support our hypothesis. A potential explanation for the lack of
significance of AS in predicting synchrony between HR and SUDS could be that individuals
with high AS may be able to detect their sensations but have difficulty verbalizing their distress
level (e.g., SUDS). Research suggests that there is a positive relationship between high AS and
alexithymia within a nonclinical sample (Devine, Stewart, & Watt, 1999). Specifically, the ASI
scores in this sample were most strongly correlated with difficulty identifying and describing
emotions. A study conducted by Peasley-Miklus and colleagues (2016) assessed the relationship
between physiology and self-report when participants varying in alexithymic traits imagined
emotion-eliciting scripts. Alexithymia includes difficulties in identifying and communicating
feelings, and desynchrony found between emotion systems in individuals with more alexithymic
traits suggests poor emotion regulation (Connelly & Denney, 2007). The hypothesis proposed by
Peasley-Miklus and colleagues (2016) was supported and they found evidence for desynchrony
because the relationship between arousal and heart rate during emotional imagery was weaker as
alexithymia increased. Zeitlin and McNally (1993) propose that individuals with higher AS may
suppress their emotions as a means to avoid the feared anxiety-related somatic sensations. The
authors further suggest that emotion suppression by high AS individuals may make expression of
emotions difficult because they may be unwilling to describe their emotions for fear of triggering
anxiety-related bodily sensations (Zeitlin & McNally, 1993). Based on these findings, it may be
expected that individuals with higher AS should not show synchrony between emotion systems
because these individuals have difficulty identifying and describing emotions and will show a
similar pattern of response as those with alexithymia (Peasley-Miklus et al., 2016). The
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desynchrony found between self-report and heart rate in this study provides evidence in support
of Peasley-Miklus and colleagues (2016) that those with emotion regulation deficits respond
desynchronously to a stress-inducing situation.
Heart Rate Variability. We hypothesized that higher HRV would predict synchrony
between HR and SUDS because “individuals with low HRV have increased difficulties in
emotion regulation in contexts requiring it” (Porges, 2007, p. 118), and individuals with higher
HRV and better emotion regulation and will respond more adaptively than an individual with
lower HRV. Emotion regulation should be related to synchrony because emotion regulation is
defined as “…the process by which one influences how, when, to what degree, and which
emotions he or she experiences and expresses” (Gross, 2002, p. 282). Those with better emotion
regulation may be able to control their self-reported emotion and physiology more adaptively
than those with low emotion regulation in a way that meets the demands of the situation. An
adaptive response would presumably involve a synchronous response from emotion systems.
Our results did not support our hypothesis: HRV was not a significant predictor of
synchrony between HR and SUDS. The non-significant results should be interpreted with
caution because HRV was calculated from the period immediately after participants had been
told that they might experience anxiogenic effects from the CO2 inhalation (see Gorlin et al.,
2014). This could have affected HRV because when participants heard the instructions for the
CO2 challenge, they may have been primed to experience an increase in anxiety before the CO2
air began flowing. This may have limited the power of HRV to predict synchrony. Thayer,
Friedman, and Borkovec (1996) examined HRV in a sample of individuals with GAD and nonclinical participants over three different periods: baseline, relaxation, and worry. Their results
showed that there were significant differences between groups across all periods, but most
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interestingly, during the period when GAD participants were told to worry, their HRV decreased
significantly compared with the control group. These results pertain to our study in that
participants may have exhibited differential HRV responses to the initial CO2 challenge
instructions, biasing our trait HRV measure. Individuals with lower HRV are likely to be
characterized by more anxiety and be more prone to worrying (Thayer et al., 1996), so hearing
the experimental instructions may have induced greater anticipatory anxiety within this sample.
Thayer and Lane (2000) provide evidence that those with low vagal tone (e.g., HRV) are more
biased to appraise threat in their environment. This in turn may have made the low-HRV group
pay even more attention to the threatening stimuli, and these individuals were then less able to
shift their attention and adapt effectively. This would result in less synchrony because these
individuals would not be responding to the CO2 challenge adaptively, and an adaptive response
would involve synchrony of emotion systems (Porges, 2007).
In light of our study’s findings, studies that have examined HRV as an individual
difference in predicting avoidance (Katahira, Jujimara, Matsuda, Okanoya, & Okada, 2014) and
thought suppression (Gillie, Vasey, & Thayer, 2015) have found that higher HRV was related to
more positive outcomes and both of these studies were able to use an unbiased measure of HRV.
We expect HRV to be related to synchrony because high HRV is a measure of adaptive emotion
regulation in contexts that require it (Gross, 2002), and adaptive functioning during emotioninducing situations involves a synchronous coordination of emotion systems. HRV should be
further examined as an individual trait difference based on the results found in other studies that
calculated HRV from a time period where participants were not primed to preemptively
experience anxiety.
Limitations and Future Directions
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The present study should be interpreted in light of several limitations. The use of
secondary data greatly limits the flexibility and hypotheses that this study could have made.
Individual differences that have been shown to affect the relationship between emotion systems
in the literature (e.g., physical fitness, respiratory health) were not included in the original study
that our data came from. Other individual differences that may likely affect the synchrony
between HR and SUDS still need to be investigated.
Future research examining the relationship between emotion systems should incorporate
the suggestions made by Hollenstein and Lanteigne (2014). Specifically, studies should include
examination of individual differences and use within-subjects analyses. Our study is one of few
to examine both synchrony and concordance within the same study and is the second study
(Butler et al., 2014) to our knowledge to use multilevel modeling, a powerful approach to
examining within-subjects effects. Further, studies have shown that when researchers account for
factors such as respiratory health and emotion regulatory strategies (Butler et al., 2014; DanGlauser & Gross, 2013; Gross, 1998; Salmon, 2001), differences between subjects in these
variables affect the degree of synchrony between self-report and physiology. Future studies
should use a multilevel modeling approach for examining repeated measures because this
technique provides more information regarding the relationship between HR and SUDS than
using bivariate correlations at one point in times. Specifically, within-subjects analyses “are
helpful to identify the meaningful covariation of different measures across time” (Alpers & Sell,
2008).
Following our study, a number of questions remain unanswered. The literature uses a
number of different methodologies and analyses that vary greatly between studies. Additionally,
there is not a consistent method for measuring synchrony and concordance, and studies often use
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poor measurement strategies. For example, in their review of 49 studies examining the
relationship between physiology and subjective experience of emotion, Campbell and Ehlert
(2012) report that in 58% of the studies they included in their review, self-report of emotional
state were either collected both pre- and post-stressor or only a single assessment post-stressor.
This method limits the data that are available and can be greatly influenced by retrospective bias.
We suggest that the specific definitions of synchrony and concordance should be adopted
as measures of within- and between-subjects effects, and that the relationship of emotion systems
over time should be used consistently and defined as synchrony. This will benefit the literature
because it will allow researchers to have a more consistent language to describe studies and draw
comparisons between studies. In our review of the literature, discordance, concordance, and no
relationship were found for different correlations between emotion systems across studies. Using
within-subjects analyses that analyze emotion systems relationships over time, identifying
individual differences that may affect this relationship, and creating a consistent standard that is
used across studies will potentially result in a greater understanding of emotion because it will
provide the field with information regarding the types of emotions and specific factors that result
in greater synchrony. In order for the field to advance, synchrony and within-subjects analyses
should be measured more consistently in studies because these methods allow for the
examination of emotion in the sense that theories have proposed that emotion operates.
Conclusion
This study is one of the first to examine both synchrony and concordance within the same
study, and it suggests the importance of conducting both within- and between-subjects analyses
because they provide different information about the relationship between emotion systems. In
studies that have examined both synchrony and concordance (Alpers & Sell, 2008; Butler et al.,
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2014), results show that synchrony is present and concordance is not. Our results are in line with
these findings and provide evidence that synchrony is a more powerful index of emotion and
should be examined in future research when the relationship between emotion systems is
analyzed. As Sze and colleagues (2010) have stated, synchrony may be a more robust index of
emotion because it allows for the examination of the relationship of emotion systems over time.
Although our findings from this study did not support all of our hypotheses, our study is
one of few that examines both synchrony and concordance within the same study, uses a withinsubjects analysis over time, and seeks to examine how individual differences affect synchrony.
The results support claims that concordance does not fully represent the nature of emotion
because concordance does not examine how these relationships change over time (Sze et al.,
2010). Explanations in support of synchrony emphasize the inclusion of individual differences
and use of within-subjects analyses (Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014). Our review of the literature
suggests that examination of individual differences and using within-subjects analyses such as
multilevel modeling will provide researchers with a better understanding of how emotion
changes over time and the way that differences can affect this relationship. The field will benefit
tremendously by including individual differences in their analyses and using within-subjects
analyses as a means to examine the synchrony of emotion systems, and in doing so, may
disentangle this mixed literature.
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Appendix

Table 1. Models predicting HR from Level-1 predictor SUDS and Level-2 predictors HRV and AS

Variable

Level 1
Intercept (γ00)
SUDS (γ10)

Unconditional
Coefficient SE
t

Model 2
Coefficient SE

79.06** (.60) 131.09

78.84** (.60) 131.53
0.15** (.01) 15.15

Level 2
Heart Rate Variability (HRV) (γ01)
Anxiety Sensitivity (AS) (γ02)

Variance components
Within-person variance (σ2)
Intercept variance (τ00)
Additional information
- 2 log likelihood
R2
R
1

2
2

*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.

42.36
97.87

t

Model 3
Coefficient SE

t

Model 4
Coefficient SE

t

Model 5
Coefficient SE

t

8.85** (.59) 132.55
.15** (.01) 15.15

.17** (.02) 10.43

78.85** (.59) 132.59
.17** (.02) 10.42

-1.83* (.74) -2.46
.03 (.07) -.50

-1.79* (.74) -2.41
-.03 (.07) -.50

-.0002 (.002) -.1
-.02 (.02) -.1

37.46
96.41

37.46
94.83

33.12
95.45

33.13
95.45

1146.89
.05
.015

4.01
.012
.016

72.25
.03
-.01

-16.23
.08
.03

Figure 1. Participants’ highest SUDS rating and its associated HR

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for our Level 1 and Level 2 variables.

Descriptive Statistics

HR
SUDS
ASI
HRV
Valid N
(listwise)

N
2698
2983
298
291
210

Range
Minimum
86.86
59.47
100.00
.00
60
0
5.39
5.34

Maximum
146.33
100.00
60
10.73

Mean
80.2804
25.9665
17.95
8.3848

Std.
Deviation
11.46128
22.59657
9.073
.79621
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